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The peoples of the Monarchy “took him to be a great spinne,“ as 
we read in the memoirs of a Hungarian politician who, a rare exception 
among Hungarian gentlemen, felt drawn to the heir apparent killed at 
Sarajevo.1 At that time the well-informed circles of the Austro — Hunga­
rian Monarchy were, of course, more or less, aware of the plans devised 
in Belvedere Palace; but all this was a real enigma to the public. Nume­
rous memoirs were published after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, i. e. 
between the two World Wars, and series of treatments extended to the 
years following World War II, in which the posthumous papers of 
Francis Ferdinand had become accessible for research and formed a 
source basis as well. All this revealed to those outside informed circles 
and to posterity the political work under the surface and tlie future 
intentions of the Archduke, both hated and misterious in his own age.'1
Modern historiography concerned with the historical role of t he 
Habsburg Monarchy and the problems of its disintegration devotes 
considerable attention, with different appraisal and frequent debates 
thorugh, to all the reform plans framed for a renewal of the empire at 
that time. Indeed, in this polemic, it seems promising to recall Francis 
Ferdinand’s plans for reshaping the empire. His Hungarian policy was 
always a cardinal point in them.
From 1889, following the early tragic death of Rudolph, the only 
son of Francis Joseph, the younger brother of the monarch, the Arch­
duke Charles Louis became heir apparent to the throne. But he was 
only a few years younger than his brother and therefore attention was 
concentrated on his sons rather than on him. Namely, it seemed proble­
matic whether Charles Louis would survive his elder brother at a!!; and 
even if he did, and acceded to the throne, it seemed evident that he could 
not have ruled long in view of his advanced age. Hence a lasting regime 
replacing the reign of Francis Joseph, one that might also have time 
enough for creative acts, could only be expected from his sons.
Francis Ferdinand, elder son of Charles Louis, was 26 years old 
when his father became heir apparent and so he was the doubtless 
successor to the crown. He himself became heir apparent only seven
years after, in 189ü upon his father’s death; but already in the first 
half of the 90’s he regarded himself, and was regarded by the people 
surrounding him, the only successor. Only the event of his possible earlv 
death, which was common talk then because of his ill-heath, could have 
shifted his expected role to his younger brother. His ideas about his 
future duties as a ruler took shape already in those years. His contempo­
raries and biographers, the earlier and the later ones alike, refer to the 
fact that his future reform plans, in their basic outlines, formulated at 
that time, and even if they changed later on, their essence was clearly 
manifest already. In his study published on the 100th anniversary of the 
Crown-Prince’s birth Rudolf Kiszling3, his most recent Austrian bio­
grapher stressed again that „the reform plans of Francis Ferdinand, which 
never were fully accomlished, date back to about 1895.”4
In the first half of the 90’s, when Francis Ferdinand’s reform plans 
concerned with the structural questions of the Habsburg Monarchy 
were shaped in outline, the initial signs of crises, unsolved in the past 
and brought about by newer contradictions, appeared alreadv in the em­
pire that was temporarily consolidated by the dualistic transformation 
of 1867. '[’lie internal consolidation of the empire after 1867. and its 
relative internal peace resulted from the partial solution of domestic 
problems and from the strengthening of its international position. The 
rearrangement of 1867 brought more liberal conditions in both parts of 
the empire, and paved the way for a wide bourgeois development, nume­
rous vestiges of feudalism lived on, however. The influence of the aris­
tocracy and the gentry in political life was still a reality, and demands 
of the peasantry and the rising middle-class, both in the economic life 
and in the political sphere, remained unsatisfied to a considerable extent.
I he problems of internal nationality questions were partiallv solved as 
well. Due to the loss of Lombardy and Venice it was only to a small 
extent that the Italian movement formed a domestic problem, and even 
t his on account of the posession of South-Tyrol and Trieste. In the first 
ecade of the Iriple Alliance this caused no problem in foreign affairs, 
Alter the wars of 1866 and 1870 the struggles about the question 
of the German unity came to an end as well. Even the Hungarian national 
movement lost its explosive force the compromise of 1867. All this pro­
moted the consolidation of the empire. The national problem of the 
•Slavs and Roumanians, however, included by the .Monarchy, remained 
unsolved; and these nations, representing separatelv no such force as, 
earlier, the Hungarians or Italiens though, formed an overwhelming 
majority in the population of the empire.
Inspite of these unsolved domestic problems a consolidation and a 
relative peace in the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867 were possible, 
lecause in the decades following the compromise both discontented 
peasantry and unsatisfied nationalities were still weak, and the labour 
movement, more and more perceptible going along with the bourgeois 
progress, was still at an early stage. On the other hand the democratic 
popular and national movements had, by the 90’s, gained considerable
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strength and labourers organized into class also appeared in the politi­
cal arena. In addition to this, contradictions in the dualistic relationship 
of Hungary and Austria gained prominence. Namely, in the first half of 
the 90’s, the problems of the A ustro-H ungarian relation became an 
issue in the political circles of the Hungarian leading classes as well. 
Although none of the groups in the leading Hungarian political stratum 
wanted to disrupt dualism, i. e. the marriege between Austria and Hun­
gary, certain layers of the wealthy Hungarian classes, however, to which 
a union of customs areas or an economic policy supporting the Austrian 
finance-capital were disadvantageous, tried to fight out more advan­
tageous positions for themselves. The state structure of the Monarchy, 
its entire social system, showed the sings of a incipient crisis in the 90’s.5
In the beginning, i. e. in the 90’s, Francis Ferdinand’s ideas were, 
adjusted to new circumstances, similar to the policy of the Archduke 
Albrecht’s military party in the 00’s and 70’s. In its days rather then 
supporting the compromise which opened up opportunities to liberal 
forces as well, this old line wanted to strenghten the Austrian, Czech, 
Polish and Hungarian feudal aristocracy in the provinces, and pushing 
dualism aside wished to create a “federation” of the lands and provinces 
of the crown, that would give more prominence to central imperial 
power and make it capable of conquests. This idea was forced in the- 
background at the time of the success of the dualistic system. But when 
the crisis came, it claimed of creating a possibility of a solution.
Taking up the lost thread, Francis Ferdinand went far beyond the 
archduke Albrecht concerning his plans for consolidating imperial pow­
er. All through the two decades of his activity, the starting-point of 
the Crown-Prince was, in all his conceptions of home and foreign policy, 
as follows: increase the power of the dynasty in order that the empire 
of the Habsburg Monarchy should be resplendent with her old glory 
again. “In the beginning, his ideas” writes Kiszling “resembled the 
structure of the United States of America: i. e. a federation of the crown 
lands with a strong central power.”6 To identify the terms with their 
actual contents, in Francis Ferdinand’s conception of the 90’s, the 
essence was not really federalism, it was centralism. What he called 
“Kronlandföderalismus” with a strong “Zentralgewalt” was in fact a 
centralized state divided into provinces. A recent biographer of the 
Austrian prime minister baron Beck, contemporary and for a while 
adherent of the crown-prince, is of the same opinion: Francis Ferdinand 
“used federalism only as master stroke in applying the principle of divide 
et impera. Federalist structure was to indirectly serve the consolidation 
of central power.”7 On his views in the 90’s, similar information is given 
by baron Margutti, a trusted man of the Habsburg House who, in the 
mid-90’s, often discussed the situation and the chances of the Monarchy 
with Francis Ferdinand. On such an occasion the Archduke himself 
elucidated the equilibrium system of the “federalism” and its centraliste 
essence relying on the German element both voiced by him, with a typical 
and interesting comparison: “Just as bigger stones and pebbles are
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crushed for making up concrete, reliably stable and actually ever-lasting, 
in order that the cement permeating the mass fuse the joining stones in a 
homogeneous manner and make an ubreakable stone block of them, the 
elements of a federal state must also be equivalent so that the perman­
ence of the state be ensured bv a solid cohesion that excludes any out­
burst of antagonisms. It is therefore that I should like to dismember 
present-day Hungary into four or five such state elements, present-day 
Bohemia into two, present-day Galicia also into two parts: then the Ger­
man people in Hungary and Bohemia could be strengthened to the 
same extent as in its Austrian mother provinces proper.”8
To divide too large units into smaller ones, first of all Hungary in 
the dualistic system, meant no articulation into national units in Francis 
Ferdinand’s range of thoughts. It was in the provincial structure of feudal 
origin that the crown-prince tried to find a justification for such divi­
sions, and became no adherent of one according to a truly national 
principle later on. either. ”He took historic right not only more valuable, 
but also stronger than the nationality principle”.s During one of the very- 
last plannings, in spring 1014, Baron Eichhoff recommended an internal 
division according to language boundaries based on the Popoviči scheme. 
The crown-prince rejected this, saying he did not want to alter the crown- 
land frontiers shaped historically, because he relied on crown-land pat­
riotism.30 Prominent role of the German element in the empire and ele­
vation of German to the status of a unified official language of the state 
— which does not contradict ,,Kronlandpatrioti.sinus” since this is not 
of national character — are important components of the “cement” 
holding the stones together. But the principal support of central power, 
the chief component in the Francis-Ferdinandian cement, is the unified 
army. When he had to give up his original ideas about crushing too big 
stones and thought of trialism and, finally, of the inevitable acceptance 
of dualism, both creation of full unity in the army and its absolute sub­
ordination to the monarch remained in all his plans and was made a 
central issue even then, for it was in this that he saw the principal 
safeguard of the growing of the Monarchy. Francis Ferdinand was utterly 
dissatisfied with the position of the army in the empire. He not only- 
disapproved of the authorization of the honvédség (the Hungarian army) 
and Landwehr though these two put together accounted only for one- 
fifth of the infantry and the cavalry; he was still more dissatisfied with 
the fact that recruitment was voted by the parliaments. Francis Ferdi­
nand wanted to carry through a full unification of military affairs and an 
absolutistic monarchial administration of all matters connected with the 
army at any rate. In this respect, he would not give up his point later on 
either, and this indicates the centralistie essence of his empire-transform­
ing Conception. Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf mentions in his 
memoirs that “unifying the whole under firm central power” was funda­
mental in the empire-transforming trend of the Crown-Prince.11
It was dualism, and the Hungarian leading stratum rigidly insisting 
on it that he regarded the chief obstacle to his aspiration directed at
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restoring the old strength of the imperial power. “Francis Ferdinand’s 
views on home politics culminated in his unshakeable conviction that, 
unless there would soon lie a turning-point, the Danubian Monarchy must 
collapse because of Hungary. He always and everywhere pondered over 
any possible means to crush the political power of Hungary in the fu­
ture.”12
Some time back certain authors ascribed Francis Ferdinand’s hatred 
towards the Hungarian leading stratum to psychological reasons, to juvenile 
experiences and affronts. But there is no need for such vague explana­
tions. This mutual antipathy and hatred had its roots in the contradic- 
tionsof the basis political attitude. Hungarian leading circles were soon, i.e. 
already in the early 90’s, informed about what the eldest son of the 
Crown-Prince Charles Louis had in the back of his mind, and made no 
secret of their hopes that this pertubing problem might as well be solved 
by his continual ill-health. On such an occasion, in autumn 1895, when 
news came again of his serious condition. Pesti ffirlap wrote, with un­
mistakable emphasis: “ He is already being prayed for. ..  ” Francis Fer­
dinand, as so often later on, too, did not conceal his rage and turned to 
the monarch. The letter, found recently in his posthumus papers, deserves 
full quotation:
..Your Majesty,
I permit myself to send to Your Majesty enclosed an issue < f Magyar 
Hirlap which contains a really infamous article about me, and to draw 
your attention to it: at the same time I appeal to you to protect me, if it 
is still possible, from the attacks to which I am constantly exposed in 
Hungary.
1 was already accustomed to attacks from this quarter, bescause 
these people know very veil what I think of them — these people who for 
the 1.000 years of their existence have constantly rebelled against the 
established dynasty, constantly aimed at overthrowing this dynasty and 
allying themselves with the enemy — these people who brought to my 
Emperor nothing hut grievous insult, calamity and discord. One only 
has to call to mind the years ’48, ’59, ’66, and finally the Compromise of 
67, which shook the old, tried establishment of the monarchy to its founda­
tions. 1 know that 1 am not popular in Hungary, and in a way I am proud 
of the fact, because 1 do not ask for the respect of such a people.
But that such a thing could be written in a country which after all 
still belongs to the monarchy — such an infamous outburst, where in eve­
ry line unrestrained joy at my illness and probable death breaks through, 
this 1 could not have imagined before!
This hurts and enrages me all the more since this paper is in touch with 
the government of Your Majesty.
But one should not wonder at it, with a Freemason government 
which glorifies a man like Kossuth and uses him for its ends and which 
introduces civil marriage into a Catholic country.
To such a government a man who thinks in conservative and dynas­
tic terms as I do is obviously an object of horror. Therefore, no confisca-
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tion, no disavowal, nothing at all resulted from the article in Hungary, 
and cur good Vaterland published a notice which I allow myself to en­
close.
I remain in the hope of retaining the favour of Your Majesty; with 
deepest reference,
Your Majesty’s most 
submissive nephew Franz 
Ferdinand.“13.
Francis Ferdinand’s early ideas pointing in a centralist direction, and 
the aspirations of the leading Hungarian stratum for consistent applica­
tion of the dualistic principle, as is shown by the letter above, produced 
mutual antipathy as early as the first half of the 90’s.
Francis Ferdinand had to be deluded in his hopes if lie counted upon 
the monarch clearly taking his side in the confrontation formulating 
with the Hungarian leaders.
It was in a consolidation of the established structure that Francis 
Joseph sought solution to his problems. Having become heir apparent in 
1890, Francis Ferdinand was, however, ceaselessly bringing up the ne­
cessity of some structural change. It was exactly therefore that the mon­
arch never granted him actual right of disposal in political matters. 
Outwardly, especially towards monarchical states, he frequently appear­
ed to substitute for the monarch in person, but this was rather a protocolar 
procedure and did not mean direct interference with the conduct of foreign 
affairs. Hut as concerned the internal problems of the army, Francis 
Joseph granted more and more actual power to the crown-prince, and 
eventually, in 1973, appointed him Inspector general (Generalinspektor) 
of the army, by which he conferred the dignity next to that of the ge­
neralissimo on him as well.
„Wherever he could, he suppressed, pushed back and neglected the 
crown-prince“ writes Kristöffy. „God forbid that he should have accept­
ed only one of his suggestions in political affairs. . . Concerning the army, 
on the other hand, including even personal matters, he granted his ne­
phew a completely free hand.“14.
Exclusion of the crown-prince from the management of political 
affairs, not eased by Francis Joseph before 1914, at the circumstances of 
the visit to Sarajevo, and granting him a fully free hand in the matters 
of the ai my at the same time, was most tightly connected with the essence 
of the differences between the views of the monarch and the crown-prince. 
The monarch prevented Francis Ferdinand from acting in fields where 
matters were administered according to the dualistic principle; but Aust­
rian centralism dominated in the Austro-Hungarian army and Francis 
Ferdinand’s decisive say in the internal affairs of the army was a guarantee 
for maintaining this situation.
Barred from political leadership as he was, the Crown-Prince Francis 
Ferdinand got a strong foothold in the army. He tried to utilize this po-
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sition penetrating into other spheres of the imperial administration, as 
well.
In Belvedere Palace, which became his residence at the turn of the 
century, there was the „military bureau“ of the Crcwn-Prince set up. 
that, strangely enough, more and more engaged in political questions. 
This was how his “workshop” , as his surroundings were called, took shape, 
where future plans of ho me and foreign policy, personal combinations and 
relationship were devised. No program was worked out in detail, however. 
It was only outlines of actions and corresponding measures that took 
shape. “The Archduke had” , writes Count Czernin, who belonged to 
his suite, in one of his memoirs, “clear-cut and definit e ideas on transform­
ing the Monarchy, but only in a general form. Actually it-was a frame­
work for a program never to be filled up or laid down in detail.”15
Francis Ferdinand’s antipathy and hatred towards the Hungarian 
leaders particularly flared up in the years after the turn of the century 
when the increase of the recruit force was accepted by the majority party 
with great reluctance, the parliamentary opposition hindered enactment 
through obstruction, and even tried to export additional rights for the 
Hungarian parliament in military affairs. It was at this time that encour­
agement was repeatedly heard from Belvedere to crush the Hungarian 
parliament through external force, that the adventurist desire of ..einmar­
schieren” was voiced.
It was amid the Hungarian parliamentary struggles surrounding the 
army issue and becoming more and more vehement that in the plannings 
of the Crown-Prince the conception of a trialism with the inclusion of 
Croatia emerged about 1903. This structure was clearly intended for a 
transitory tactical solution, expressly for crushing dualism, i.e. the influ­
ence of Hungarian leading circles on the affairs of the empire. Actually, 
Francis Ferdinand was, in principle, as much against trialism as was 
opposed to dualism. When in 1901 he felt that there was such a 
danger on the part of the Czechs, he insisted on a catego­
rical rejection in a letter written to the Austrian prime minister: „With 
dualism we already have pushed our Monarchy to the brink of the grave 
and now just as eminent a danger emerges on the part of the Czechs! The 
situation is that if we yield now, have dealings with the Czechs and 
make concessions to them, everything will be lost and we will artificially 
produce a trialism which will completely destroy the structure of the 
Monarchy already too much relaxed.“1®
The conception of a trialism to be created with Croatia was embrac­
ed for a short time; in the background there by the old Habsburgian 
tactics of applying the principle of „divide and rule“, by supporting the 
Croatian movement to counteract Hungarian demands raised towards 
Vienna. In autumn 1905, under the effect of the „Fiume resolution“. 
Francis Ferdinand gave up this policy since he felt that in the Croatian 
movement „the antagonism directed, so far, only against Budapest, has 
now assumed an antidynastic character.“17
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Tn 1906 the followers of Francis Ferdinand got hold of important 
positions in Austrian politics and his influence was felt intensely with 
their mediation for a few years. Baron Beck, former tutor, then intimate 
man to the crown-prince, was made prime minister of Austria in spring 
1 Of 16.18
In autmn 1906, his trusted men were appointed to important posts of 
the Monarchy, such as those of cemmonminister of foreign affairs (baron 
Aehrenthal). commomhinister of war (general Schönaich), the post of 
the chief of staff (Conrad von Hötzendorf). The influence of Francis Fer­
dinand was strong at that time rot only in Austrian and Austro-Hungar­
ian governmental matters but also in Austrian political parties, moreover, 
in publicist circles as well. He also rallied leaders round himself ofthe natio­
nalities in Hungary, such as the politicians Vaida-Voevod and Maniu 
(Roumanians), Milian Hodzha (Slovak), Wilder (Croatian), Steinacker 
and Brandseh (Transylvanian Saxons). There was talk, with some exag­
geration though, about a “dual government” in political circles of Vienna 
in those years, hinting thereby at the dissimilar political courses of Fran­
cis Joseph and Francis Ferdinand. The „workshop“ of Belvedere Palace 
was busy at that time, indeed, although its products were little appreciat­
ed by contemporaries and historical judgement in general.
The hatred of the Crown-Prince against Hungarian ruling classes 
brought him to contact nationality leaders of Hungary, and lie also kept 
winking at the Hungarian labour movement . He objected to an introduc­
tion of universal suffrage in Austria in 1906 which reduced the importance 
o fth e  German element. In Hungary, in 1905, he supported the policy 
of Kristoffy and Fehervary promising suffrage for it was thereby that he 
hoped to living the Hungarian ruling classes to heel. Francis Ferdinand 
wanted to assign an important role to the Catholic Church and especially 
supported the Austrian Christian Socialists. He wanted to make Lueger, 
Christian Socialist leader in Vienna, his prime minister. That the Crown- 
Prince should have wanted to depend on lower classes is nothing but a 
legend, a similar one to his federalism. As Margutti recorder Francis 
Ferdinand, just as Francis Joseph, relied, first of all. on the aristocracy; 
but he was hostile to the Hungarian aristokracy and considered all means 
suitable for crushing their political power.19
The antipathy against Francis Ferdinand was no less profound in 
the Hungarian leading circles. Of political parties it was only the leading 
circles o fthe  Catholic Popular Party that established contacts with him. 
Certain Hungarian politicians and publicists, e.g. Kristoffy, did belong to 
his „workshop”, but they were no representatives o fth e  stratum of the 
Hungarian society.
In 1911 Tisza, the man most generally recognized by leading Hunga­
rian circles, overtly told Count Czernin. confidential man to the Crown- 
Prince, that in the defence of the enacted dualistic and system the nation­
ality policy in connection he would if it need be even oppose the King.20 
It was therefor that Francis Ferdinand regarded Count Tisza a “rebel.” 
On the occasion ofthe Count’s being made head of government again, he
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told his trusted man, Berdolff that, if he accede to the throne “it would 
not even be for 24 hours that he would have the Count at the head of the 
administration or else he would risk that, in 48 hours, the Count should 
organise a revolution against him.”21
Francis Ferdinand’s plan to “reform” the Monarchy was a retro­
grade attempt. I t  would have given the aristocracy, the court and the 
German element of the empire still greater power. This “reform” plan 
was unreal at the same time, and an attem pt at its practical implemen­
tation could have precipitated a still more serious internal crisis. I t  was 
not out of their sympathizing with progress however, that the Hungarian 
leading circles opposed these plans. They simply defended the structure 
of dualism. Insistence on the dualistic conception was also retrograde, 
because it involved the oppression of the democratic aspirations of 
nationalities and masses of population. A renascence could only have been 
brought about by a democratic transformation, or at least by a step 
towards democratic progress. And this was opposed to both by Francis 
Ferdinandian and dualistic conception alike.
After all, the crown-prince never found sufficient support in the 
leading Austrian circles either, and many of his former adherents ab­
andoned him; nor could he neglect the uniform reserve of the Hungarian 
leading classes. “He had to pour more and more water in the wine of his 
political plans for the future” writes Margutti, “ . . . and at last he ended 
up at nothing else but dualism. Despite all this, I do not think that he 
ever should have given up his original plans completely and irrevocably.”22
A survey of Francis Ferdinand’s plans and aspirations towards 
reshaping the empire, as well as their fate, indicates that the leading 
classes of the Habsburg Monarchy were lacking in the capacity and the 
posisibility of bringing about any progressive, sound renewal of the empire. 
It calls for a separate study to dedide whether such a possibility was given 
by the movements of the democratic forces which were alien to both 
Francis Ferdinand and the Hungarian leading classes and againts which 
they both displayed a hostile attitude.
These findings of our analydis are confirmed if we include a study of 
plans in the field of foreign policy. This is justified in every respect. There 
is always an organic correlation between the internal structure of a given 
country and its foreign policy. Francis Ferdinand’s empire-transforming 
plans and his ideas in foreign affairs show close correlation, as well.
Following the traditions of Albrecht’s military party, Francis Ferdi­
nand was for resolute actions, in foreign policy. Not against the Prussians 
though, as Albrecht did, but in alliance with the Germans and by neutral­
izing Russia he was planning against the Balkan peoples. He strived not 
only for the annexation Bosnia and Hercegovina, already occupied, but 
also for that of entire Serbia. He had, however, in addition to the acquisi­
tion of further considerable Southern Slav territories, also that of Rou- 
mania in mind. In order to win over the Roumanian leaders for thisplan, 
he would have held cut the prospect of surrendering Transylvania to a 
Roumania embodied in the Monarchy.23
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Serbia and Itoumania were to be further building-stones in the 
territorially growing empire. But Francis Ferdinand’s empire-building 
plans went far beyond that. For the Monarchy he planned to obtain the 
Balkan territories still possessed by Turkey, which then were given to the 
Balkan countries as a result of the Balkan War of 1912. By this he planned 
to create a basis for the Monarchy for it scolonization scheme overseas. 
He wanted to set up naval bases on the Albanian seashore and at Salo­
nika. “He envisaged the acquisition of colonies” wrote Kristoffv, • which 
he planned to carry out through Albania and Salonika.”21. It was this 
that his special attention devoted to the navy was connected with. The 
Crown-Prince planned to make the Monarchy a big sea power. He often 
donned his admiral’s uniform and was fond of sailing to the island of 
Brioni by one of the battleships. He incessantly urged the construction 
of expensivedreadnoughts and reproached Francis Joseph for neglecting 
this branch of military development.
Francis Ferdinand also wanted to reshape the relations of the Mo­
narchy with the Great Powers. For this hedid not intend to relaxt he alliance 
with the Germans, he wished to créât rather a new triple alliance by 
reviving the former agreement of the three emperors. The foreign minister 
Aehrenthal acted, presumably, in accord with Francis Ferdinand’s 
intention when he pondered over an intervention in support of the czar in 
a critical stage of the Russian revolution25. He wanted to create this 
alliance of the three emperors on a “Holy Alliance” pattern: he emphasi­
zed the common interest on an internal consolidation of the dinasties.
Besides Serbia, the Crown-Prince was especially hostile towards 
Italy, for it was this country that he regarded the most immediate en- 
dangerer of the building up of his naval power and of his expansion in the 
Balkans.
The Vienna court and official Austrian leading circles did not iden­
tify themselves with Francis Ferdinand’s conception of foreign polie y, but 
ideas similar to his appeared in their policy.There wereinfluentialadkerents ' 
in Austrian leading circles of the annexation of Serbia and of the solution 
of the South Slav problem within the scope of the Monarchy. In the years 
preceding the War, Francis Joseph himself was also strongly inclined 
towards solving the South slav question by further annexations.2fi. 
Plans of the Crown-Prince about foreign policy were also strongly 
objected to by Hungarian leading circles. The acquisition of Serbia and 
Itoumania would have meant the loss of the South Slav and Transylvanian 
nationality territories; on the other hand, a further increase of the 
nationality element within the Monarchy would have made it difficult 
to maintain dualism. They, too, urged the weakening of these two 
countries and their binding to the Monarchy, but wanted to retain a 
formal, legally independent status with them by all means, since it was 
only in this way that they regarded both uncurtailed rule over the natio­
nalities and the system of dualism guaranteed.
Annexation of Serbia and Roumania would also have entailed 
economic disadvantage to the agrarian interests of the Hungarian big
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landowners. Hungarian big estates enjoyed a monopolistic position within 
the customs area of the Monarchy. This monopoly would have been endan­
gered by Roumanian and Serbian agricultural products, had they come 
within this customs area.
Hungarian leading circles did not share the sharply anti-Italian line 
of the Crown-Prince, either, and considered an excessive building up 
of naval power illusory, too. Yet, a hegemony over the Balkans was, 
on a different pattern of concrete solution though, just as much desired bv 
them. The final results of our investigation into empire-transforming 
conceptions seem to be confirmed by this survey over the plans and 
debates on foreign policy. Foreign policy both Francis Ferdinandian and 
official, this latter supported by the Hungarian leading stratum as well, 
were aimed at hamstringing the peoples of the Balkan. Understanding 
their interests was alien to both, just as empire-transforming conceptions 
of Francis Ferdinand and conceptions insisting on dualism equally failed 
to comprehend the democratic and national interests of the peoples 
enclosed in the empire and dependent on one another.
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